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Abstract. 
Henry Hansmann has argued that ownership is best allocated to the group of 
patrons for which the total of cost of governance and contracting for all the firm’s 
patrons combined is minimized. This paper re-founds Hansmann’s model by 
considering an additional set of costs, the costs of excluding certain groups of 
patrons from the firm’s decision-making or governance process. The objective, 
which is Coasean in both spirit and formulation, is to show (1) that firms with 
“multi-stakeholder governance” emerge to economize on exclusion costs, and (2) 
that the efficient governance structure minimizes the total cost of membership, 
contracting and exclusion costs for all the firm’s patrons combined. The paper 
argues that this setup helps explain so-called “public organisation,” defined as 
organisations with public interest objectives, and further claims that this model 
helps explaining the recent emergence of multi-stakeholder enterprises within the 
third sector. 
 
Thanks. 
We wish to thank Pier Angelo Mori, Ermanno Tortia, Murray Fulton and 
anonymous reviewers on previous versions for insightful comments. Thank you 
to ICA (Paris, 2015) and SIE (Trento, 2015) conference participants. This paper 
was written with the contribution of the British Academy/Leverhulme Research 
Grant nr. SG150560 on “Assessing governance models of healthcare social 
enterprises.”  
JEL: L2, L3, H4, O35 
  
2 
 
In devising and choosing between social arrangements we should have 
regard for the total effect. This, above all, is the change in approach that I 
am advocating. 
(Coase, 1960, p. 44) 
1. Introduction 
 
Henry Hansmann has argued that ownership is best allocated to the group of 
patrons for which the total of cost of governance and contracting for all the firm’s 
patrons combined is minimised. This paper re-founds Hansmann’s model by 
considering an additional set of costs, the costs of excluding certain groups of 
patrons from the firm’s decision-making or governance process.  
The objective, which is Coasean in both spirit and formulation, is to show (1) that 
firms with “multi-stakeholder governance” emerge to economize on exclusion 
costs, and (2) that the efficient governance structure minimizes the sum of cost of 
membership, contracting and exclusion for all the firm’s patrons combined. This 
setup helps explain what can be called “public organisations,” defined as 
organisations with public interest objectives, and further claims that this model 
helps explaining the recent emergence of multi-stakeholder enterprises. 
The theoretical framework is set up by Hansmann’s model. Hansmann (1996) 
focuses on the costs of ownership. He thinks that the most efficient form of 
ownership occurs when a firm is governed by ‘the class of patrons for whom the 
costs of market contracting are highest’ and ‘the costs of ownership are lowest’ 
(1996, p. 47).  More generally, his calculus indicates that in order to reach 
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efficiency, governance must minimise total costs or the sum, over all the firm 
patrons, of costs of contracting (CC) and costs of ownership (CO).  
𝐶𝑂𝑗 + ∑ 𝐶𝐶𝑖
𝑛−1
𝑖=1
 
In this way, ownership economises on transaction costs by avoiding market 
contracting for whichever “patron” is assigned control rights. If it were not for 
CO, it would follow that all patrons should be assigned control rights to minimise 
costs.  
Even in the presence of CO, however, there is no a priori to believe that such 
costs are less than CC for only one class of patrons – this could be the case for 
multiple patrons, and perhaps even all patrons. Hansmann (1996, p. 44) actually 
points this out in his book in the sub-section entitled ‘Why Not Make Everybody 
an Owner?’, but maintains that CO would multiply if multiple groups were 
involved due to their diversity and heterogeneity of interests. He suggests that 
control over decision-making should be given to one type of stakeholder, 
specifically the one whose interests are less safeguarded by a contract with 
respect to other interest holders, provided that CO are kept at reasonable levels. 
This would happen, for example, if clients (e.g. patients in healthcare; debtors 
and creditors in banking, etc.) did not want to be directed by investors’ interests 
and recognised the advantage of self-directing themselves, according to their own 
interests. Inclusion of the most vulnerable public (vis a vis ‘investors’ in this case) 
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is the solution to contract incompleteness, information asymmetries and 
ultimately a response to the possibility that investors pass the risk of enterprise 
onto users or clients. This criterion allows to minimise conflict and therefore total 
costs. 
The problem we identify with substituting market with organised transactions 
under the control of one single category of patrons is in the assumption. It is 
anticipated in fact that there is only one market that does not coordinate resources 
efficiently. However, the reality of production and consumption is more complex 
than this. When multiple and potentially conflicting interests are at stake and 
transaction costs are present, nor market contracting, nor the single entrepreneur 
or decision-maker representing one class of interests can avoid to produce 
negative (intended or unintended) effects on the excluded patrons and on society 
more broadly, unless there is a way to broaden the scope of decision-making.   
This interpretation is supported by the specific view on externalities proposed by 
Meade (1973). He defined externalities as ‘an event which confers an appreciable 
benefit (inflicts an appreciable damage) on some person or persons who were not 
fully consenting parties in reaching the decision or decisions which led directly 
or indirectly to the event in question’ (quoted in Cornes and Sandler, 1999: 39).  
Interestingly, Meade relates the occurrence of externalities to the exclusion of 
interested actors from the decisions that led to the external effect. Another 
peculiarity of this definition is that it does not refer to any specific context or 
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institutional solution (Cornes and Sandler, 1999). Therefore, this interpretation of 
externalities explains their existence by pointing at the exclusion of patrons and 
their interests, rather than to the absence of a specific coordination structure, such 
as markets and underpinning property rights. In addition, Meade’s definition 
leaves the option open for multiple markets to fail at the same time; or not to fail 
at all, but in fact changing the distribution of income when decision-makers alter 
trading prices also for other patrons. The latter exemplifies what Meade calls a 
‘distributive externality’. 
Differently from Meade’s interpretation, externalities are commonly understood 
as ‘uncompensated interdependencies’ in the context of competitive markets. The 
solution proposed by economic theory is to define the external effects as a good 
or a disutility that can be traded. It is then necessary to define who has property 
rights on the good to be exchanged, that is who can claim a monetary 
compensation or derive income from excluding others from exchange (cf. Alt and 
Shepsle, 1990). Thus, costs of exclusion are understood as the costs maintained 
to exclude others from the use of resources. They are, in other words, transaction 
costs borne by the owner of property rights.  
Differently, in this work, exclusion costs are meant as the costs borne by the 
excluded. They are externalities borne by the non-owners. Our argument is that 
the specification of property rights to be traded on the market addresses only one 
type of exclusion cost, e.g. those that can be compensated for a price without 
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causing the persistence of the externality. For exclusion costs that cannot be 
equated with a good and traded on the market, different institutional solutions are 
required.  
While economic theory has explained why including patrons can be costly, it is 
less clear why so little attention has been devoted to the fact that excluding 
patrons can also be costly. The paper’s model introduces exclusion costs in the 
economic calculus used to identify production governance, which typically 
includes costs of transacting and costs of ownership. Rather than associating 
exclusion costs with property rights to be compensated ex-post, the model 
identifies the coordination solution that minimises their emergence ex-ante, as 
well as total governance costs.  
In shedding light on the inclusion of multiple patrons, the model sets the premises 
to define what can be called the ‘public organisation’. Clearly here the word 
‘public’ is not used in the traditional sense of being owned by the public authority. 
It is rather understood in the sense of having multiple patrons and pursuing a 
plurality of interests by means of collective action and consistently with 
principles of social justice. Building on transaction cost theory (Williamson, 
1997), the paper’s model indicates that the public organisation will include 
patrons: 
i. The higher the costs of exclusion, or the highest the costs of relying on 
market transactions 
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ii. The highest the value of continuity in transactions  
iii. The less the rise of the cost of organising as one more patron is included, 
and the slower the speed of the rise. 
Bridging theory with practice, the model also helps explain the emergence of 
what are increasingly identified as multi-stakeholder enterprises in welfare 
sectors. It also contributes to the policy debate around the creation of more 
inclusive economies, under the so-called ‘inclusive capitalism’ agenda promoted 
by the former US Treasury Secretary Lawrence Summers, which recently 
featured also in a Governor of the Bank of England’s speech (Carney, 2014). 
The structure of the paper is as follows. Sections 2 complements this introductory 
Section with a discussion of Hansmann’s model. Section 3 discusses the problem 
of extending membership to multiple patrons. Sections 4 presents a new model 
which includes exclusion costs. Section 5 discusses the new model in terms of 
supporting institutional solutions. Section 6 concludes. 
2. Discussion of Hansmann’s model  
 
There are some critical points in Hansmann’s model which require attention. In 
this Section the paper problematises elements which are not consistent with 
patrons’ participation in decisions of interest, and therefore enable the persistence 
of exclusion costs as per Meade’s definition of externalities. As summarised in 
the introduction, in Hansmann’s model exclusion costs are resolved with 
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contracts. The assumption that underpins the imperative of single stakeholder 
control is that this solution maximises efficiency since CO for the controlling 
patron is lower than the sum of the costs of trading with all the remaining patrons.  
Occasionally, however, Hansmann notices that “enfranchising” a patron requires 
that another is “disenfranchised”, and that yet another patron is denied franchise 
(Hansmann, 1996, p. 43). The disenfranchised, in Hansmann’s calculus, are all 
the organisation’s patrons linked to the controlling patron (who bears CO) by 
means of transactions (which generate total CCi). For example, a single-
stakeholder, investor-owned organisation is justified by high levels of transaction 
costs affecting investors. Because of this, investors would be “enfranchised,” 
whilst other patrons (e.g. consumers, workers, volunteers, creditors) would be 
disenfranchised. With all the disenfranchised patrons, the investor would set 
contracts since markets work with lower transaction costs and, overall, market 
relations are assumed to protect disenfranchised patrons using well-defined 
contracts. Other patrons, at the same time, are denied any form of association with 
the controlling patrons. For example community constituencies would not be 
involved neither through ownership, nor through contracts.  
The first point to be noticed is that Hansmann’s model does not consider that 
multiple markets can fail at the same time (for example the market for capital, for 
labour, for finance, for goods). The interests of the disenfranchised are 
safeguarded via the contractual system, assuming that markets are competitive 
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and contract law is well defined. However, for the “not consenting” patrons, 
restricting control to one single patron would generate high costs of exclusion, 
which are not captured by contractual solutions. In fact improving the efficiency 
for one patron only, whilst disenfranchising or denying any form of association 
to other patrons cannot be argued to be, overall, a Pareto-improvement.  
For other transacting patrons markets keep failing. Because contractual solutions 
address some elements of inclusion and not others, most of the sources of market 
failure that Hansmann identifies (footnote) persist for excluded patrons. For 
example, information asymmetries (e.g. in medical or educational services) and 
lock-in situations (for example in energy markets or financial services) imply 
higher prices, lower quality, or the unethical employment of users’ resources, 
(e.g. users’ personal information; clients savings) to extract extra profits.  
Consider school governance. The allocation of resources amongst activities (such 
as playgrounds, support to disadvantaged pupils, or additional afternoon tutorials) 
can be done by the head of school depending on the public funding available and 
reporting to a controlling authority. In this case the prevailing cost of exclusion 
would be the excessive standardisation of services, and a complete dependence 
on public sector’s budget allocation to schooling for improvements. At the 
opposite extreme, private schools would use the market, by asking families to pay 
fees for accessing additional infrastructures and service improvement. Here the 
prevailing exclusion cost regards pricing under information asymmetries and 
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access, which would be denied to those who are not able to pay, albeit education 
can be regarded as a merit good. Differently, in community-run schools, 
allocation would be done in principle by a board of trustees including multiple 
community constituencies, with links to local authority but more independent 
from state funds than conventional institutions.1 Such a solution could be argued 
to mitigate the exclusion costs generated by the other alternatives. 
The fact that patrons cannot bring into the debate their interests, knowledge and 
experience also creates broad exclusion costs in terms under-consumption. This 
is due to mark-up on service prices, or to choices about the nature of products or 
solutions that become generally available to society. There are various reasons 
for this. Exclusion denies diversity, generating costs in terms of inappropriate 
problem framing, lower use of creativity, and a more modest match between the 
innovations introduced and societal needs.  
In addition, exclusion erodes an array of non-material benefits which cannot be 
subject to property right definition or subsumed by a contract. Evidence indicates 
that excluded patrons benefit only in a marginal way from the learning and 
relational experience that derives from taking part in activities (Sacchetti and 
Tortia, 2013). Exclusion, moreover, has been identified as one of the causes that 
                                                          
1 In the UK, cooperative schools are called “independent state-schools”. They have been growing since the 
Education and Inspection Act of 2006. 
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reduces psychological satisfaction, by impoverishing individuals’ sense of 
belonging, accomplishment and overall wellbeing (Deci and Ryan, 2008).  
Another reason is the failure to generate social capital.  Woolcock (2001, 13) 
suggests that ‘social capital refers to the norms and networks that facilitate 
collective action’. Such norms have been associated with cooperation, trust, and 
reciprocity of behaviours. In this sense, exclusion prevents the development of 
these norms and ties’ leading to lack of collective action more broadly (Aoki, 
1984; Ostrom 2010; Borzaga and Tortia, 2015; Fitzroy and Kraft, 1986; Lopes et 
al. 2009; Putterman, 1984; Thomson, 2015).  
Another disadvantage is related to resource allocation. Because exclusion denies 
the right to voice, patrons will be less keen to input resources. For example in 
non-profit firms (but the same could be said for the public sector) exclusion may 
engender less voluntary work, erosion of pro-social motivations, membership 
fees, donations which would otherwise be deployed in other situations. On the 
contrary, inclusion facilitates recovering resources that the organisation can then 
apply to develop activities in support of the needs identified by participated 
governing bodies.  
These limitations emerges in Hansmann’s treatment of non-profits. He 
acknowledges that non-profits may prevail when the costs of both ownership and 
contracting are exceptionally high for a given class of patrons (usually 
donors/users). On the one hand, giving ownership to any other class of patrons 
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would ‘inefficiently threaten those patrons’ interests’. Nonetheless, giving 
ownership to the weakest class would incur very high CO, since the non-profit 
structure incurs costs of its own in the form of the managerial agency problem 
(Hansmann, 1996, pp. 48-49). Notably, this logic is inconsistent with his usual 
calculus of comparing the costs of contracting with those of ownership. As a 
solution he suggests that non-profits should have no owners, and be controlled by 
a board of trustees.  
It therefore seems that even his analysis of non-profits confirms that the calculus 
is based on some missing type of cost that he does not explicitly identify, related 
to the absolute CC as opposed to just their comparison with CO. What Hansmann 
suggests is that, even if it is not efficient to make a certain class of patrons owners, 
excluding them from governance would incur such a high level of costs 
(unspecified) beyond information asymmetries for it to be undesirable (what 
Hansmann dubiously refers to as ‘inefficiently threatening their interests’). The 
point here relates not only to non-profits but to all types of firms, since Hansmann 
in fact states that ‘the distinction between non-profit firms and firms owned by 
patrons who are very poor monitors is often negligible’ (Hansmann, 1996, p. 49) 
and goes on to show how this is true for all forms of enterprise (e.g. worker 
cooperative, user cooperative, investor-owned firm, albeit he acknowledges that 
this latter typology can be equivalent to a cooperative of investors). 
3. Responses to coordination failure  
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The inadequacy of the model to explain how to protect multiple interests at the 
same time is that it does not consider exclusion costs generated by single-
stakeholding, mostly because it relies on the well-functioning contracts. Rather, 
the inclusion of patrons with diverse features requires a variety of institutional 
solutions. Ownership represents one solution, but it can be complemented by 
other forms of representation in decision-making bodies which are aimed at 
requesting (and enabling) managers to justify their actions in front of multiple 
patrons. The requirement would enable managers to take into account a wider set 
of interests, beyond those of owners, when making strategic decisions.  
As an illustration, consider a hospital and community care clinics owned by 
investors, who in Hansmann’s terms, are good monitors and homogeneous 
enough to bear low CO. The members decide to centralise diabetes community 
services within the hospital in order to take advantage of scale economies. This 
implies a closure of local diabetes clinics. Despite the costs of exclusion 
engendered for specific patrons and the collectivity, it would be hard for 
managers to reject this strategy if they owed a fiduciary duty exclusively to 
investors. However, if the duty of loyalty is broadly understood to apply to a 
wider set of patrons, i.e.  patients in general, and specific classes of patients such 
as elderly people and people with reduced mobility, it would be possible for 
health managers to reject the indication to centralise services on the grounds that 
there are vulnerable members and society at large who would suffer from 
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centralisation and increasingly so given demographic trends. Losses for the 
weakest classes of patrons (e.g. worsening of health conditions) and for society 
(e.g. in terms of under-consumption of preventive care, hospitalisation or 
increased marginalisation of the elderlies, for instance) would outweigh the gains 
for investors. With multi-stakeholder governance, managers would not be able to 
support and justify actions to preserve their position whilst, at the same time, 
disregard the interest of vulnerable patrons. Extending representation and, 
therefore, managers’ fiduciary duty, would have the effect of reducing the 
production of exclusion costs.  
4. A “total effect” governance model  
 
The persistence of exclusion costs suggests that, overall, it is simplistic to ignore 
them on the basis that they are irrelevant, as Hansmann’s model seems to suggest. 
The model presented here, instead, requires to account for the overall costs of 
governance, rather than being confined to ownership and contracts. In this 
Section, we re-found Hansmann’s model to include exclusion costs and ground a 
new way of apprising governance solutions. 
An organisation that takes into account multiple interests is referred to as a ‘public 
organisation’, as defined in the introduction, as representing multiple patrons and 
pursuing a plurality of interests consistently with principles of social justice. Such 
an organisation will grow if additional publics and their interests are coordinated 
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through the organisation, and becomes smaller as the firm abandons the 
organisation of these interests.  
The question then would be: when does the organisation stop including patrons? 
Given a number of patrons, 𝑁, who are interconnected with the organisation 
(directly or indirectly, informally or on a contractual basis), the inclusion of 
publics (PI) minimises a function that includes membership costs (CM), 
contractual costs (CC), and the costs of exclusion (CE). CM include both CO and 
costs of governing without ownership. The choice of whether to include new 
publics (PI) needs considering CM, CC and CE together.  According to the model, 
new publics are included if CE>CM. The total-effects model is stylised below. 
𝑀𝑖𝑛 ∑(𝐶𝑀𝑖 + 𝐶𝐶𝑖 + 𝐶𝐸𝑖)
𝑛
𝑖=1
 
Membership costs (CM) are dynamic in our model, and change with the number 
of patrons included. The inclusion of one more patron implies an increase in CM 
and a change in the distribution of resources and outcomes, which lowers the 
costs of exclusion (CE). At the same time, contractual costs (CC) decrease, since 
coordination with newly involved patrons stops being the object of contracts 
(provided that patrons had a contractual relation with the organisation, otherwise 
CC are unchanged). In order for CE to be zero, contracts should remain in place 
only with those patrons whose utility is mostly satisfied through the market 
mechanism. 
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The decision-making criteria outlined above yields to the condition CM=CC+CE. 
It follows that, in our model, patrons are integrated in the governance of the 
organisation until CM<(CC+CE). This means that publics are included until CM 
are lower than the sum of CC and CE, and if CC do not change across governance 
solutions, when CM are lower than CE (for CC to remain constant, transfers of 
control rights would have to happen at the same cost for all patrons through an 
exchange, i.e. a compensation). In this model, the most efficient solution, from 
both an allocative and distributive point of view, is one for which total costs are 
the lowest. The model is therefore useful to compare different solutions on the 
basis of the total level of governance costs generated. Following this construct, 
Hansmann’s model would be a specific solution that can be applied only when 
CE are disregardable or, in other words, when only one market fails. 
5. Discussion 
5.1 Deliberation 
 
The total-effect model entails that the inclusion of an additional patron must 
reduce CE more than it raises CM and CC. This means that a patron must have a 
considerable advantage in joining the organisation, which can happen only if its 
interests are acknowledged by the decision making-process more than what 
contractual solutions can do. On the other hand, CM must not rise uncontrolled. 
To explain how, on the one hand, CE are reduced and, on the other, CM are kept 
at bay once membership is enlarged, we need to extend the scope of analysis from 
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formal structures to processes. This Section discusses the role of binding 
agreements amongst patrons and deliberative processes.  
Consider an organisation with a board of directors where different patrons are 
represented. Depending on the statute of the organisation, some can be elected 
among the owners while others can represent non-owners. In the spirit of Meade’s 
discussion of externalities, to reduce CE the board needs to reach a joint 
participated decision on the strategic direction of the organisation, which 
managers can then implement. Case studies and experimental results, one for all 
the work of Ostrom (1990), indicate that shared decisions and binding agreements 
are the outcome of cooperation among patrons. A precondition to cooperation is 
identified in communication. These studies show that when individuals can 
communicate between and among each other, agreements are respected (Sacconi 
and Faillo, 2010). In addition, experimental results show that cooperative 
agreements are respected also by those who are not cooperative in the first place. 
In their work, Grimalda and Sacconi (2005) point out that this happens because, 
as individuals interact within a cooperative institutional setting, they develop 
preferences that enable them to respect the agreement. In other words, preferences 
towards cooperation are shaped by the interaction of actors within an appropriate 
agreement. Clearly, these findings requires a re-consideration of one of the main 
arguments in economic theory, that is the inefficiency and instability of collective 
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decision-making (besides Hansmann see also Olson, 1971/2009; Vidal, 2014; 
Birchall, 2014). 
The aim of reducing CE requires extending membership to interested patrons at 
the lowest possible CM. The implication of institutional studies for the total-
effect model is that when aims are complex and require specialised and 
complementary investments (as in the case of social service production whereby 
service continuity is essential) the rise of CM is avoided by binding agreements 
and non-opportunistic communication between and among patrons.  
This form of communication has been discussed as deliberation, especially in the 
context of democratic and participatory institutions (references). Deliberation 
would work as a form of substantive involvement which goes beyond the formal 
engagement entailed in the right to vote in organisational assemblies (which is 
typical of the ownership relation), or the contractual obligation to deliver a 
service. Rather, the function of deliberation is to make each and every patron’s 
interest explicit and yet transform it by the cooperative interaction, generating 
solutions based on argument rather than on power unbalances. These are more 
likely to be respected and implemented than solutions generated by exclusive 
processes (Dewey, 1927; Granovetter, 1991; Yeung, 2005; Sacchetti, 2015). 
Deliberation, in this sense, contributes to lower CE.  
Examples of solutions that entail binding agreements (to lower CM) and 
deliberative processes (to lower CE) are provided by organised transactions 
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between public administrations and social economy organisations in the co-
production of specific community services (Pestoff, 2012; Ostrom, 1996; 
Sacchetti, 2016).  
5.2 Multistakeholder solutions 
 
As discussed, multi-stakeholder organising is a way of governing production 
where multiple patrons (such as managers, workers, volunteers, users, donors, 
funders) share strategic control for their common good. It is meant to give voice 
and to empower patrons in an organisational context, normally designed to 
produce meritorious goods, such as welfare and community services, including 
public utilities, but not exclusively. The role of multistakeholder structures has 
been discussed by scholars who have emphasized its role in the provision of social 
and welfare services (Pestoff 1994, 1996; Borzaga and Mittone, 1997; Laville 
and Nyssens, 2001; Sacconi, 2006; Sacchetti and Tortia, 2008; Cafaggi and 
Iamiceli, 2009).  
The distinguishing feature of multi-stakeolder organisations is that patrons with 
an interest in the activities of the organisation can contribute to decide what and 
how to produce, or how economic surplus is distributed. Case studies show that 
multi-stakeholder forms capitalise on the resources of multiple patrons at 
different levels, by involving them as owners, or by including them in the board 
of directors or through consultative or controlling committees (Sacchetti and 
Tortia, 2014; Sacchetti 2016). By sharing decision-making power, this socially 
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participated form of governance leads to a unique feature, which is that the 
activities of the organisation are run cooperatively. In this way, the outcomes can 
benefit multiple patrons, including owners but also non-owners (Borzaga and 
Mittone, 1997).  
The total-effect model can be usefully applied to the study of multi-stakeholder 
organisational forms. Albeit these are starting to emerge and have been regulated 
by law in several countries, they are still under theorised. Our model entails that 
the main reason why it is advantageous to establish an organisation with multi-
stakeholder governance is when, in its absence, CE are higher than the CM and 
CC taken together. Multi-stakeholder governance is therefore desirable only 
when it minimises total governance costs. This explanation can justify why 
experiences of social enterprises for which countries (e.g. France, Italy, Spain) 
have set legal requirements towards the inclusion of multiple patrons have had in 
general a slow impact on the sector (Galera, ). Experiences of multi-stakeholding 
in fact suggest that, to implement inclusion, major organisational innovations are 
required, not least to create the conditions for participation, with varying costs 
attached. Our model, in this case, would suggest that in order for multi-
stakeholder solutions to become more widespread, CM must decrease, while 
excluded patrons should raise awareness of what they miss out by relying solely 
on market contracting.  
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5.3 Implications for research 
 
Following from experiences of multi-stakeholder organisations, further research 
could shed light on the factors that can lower CM and increase a culture of 
participation. Clarifying these questions could support a better understanding of 
regulatory requirements. We know, in fact that in specific sectors, such as 
welfare, the inclusion of more than one patrons can be required by law. But there 
is a growing amount of experiences, such as across third sector organisations, 
which evidence that inclusive governance can occur voluntarily prior or instead 
of regulation, through voluntary multiple membership.   
In addition, research can address how organisations with an open approach to 
patrons can ensure engagement in collective action, how cooperation and 
preferences towards cooperation are developed, so that agreements are respected 
and CM are kept under control. This would imply to further research on when 
patrons are best included via ownership, or via board representation, or both. 
In parallel, research can address how exclusion is applied, hypothesising that in 
a ‘public organisation’ this is limited to the presence of conflicts of interest 
leading to the effective possibility of opportunistic behaviour.  
Another aspect for research is the exploration of democratic practices. While 
studies have mostly addressed formal participation, we have mentioned that this 
is not limited to formal voting rules associated with ownership, e.g. one-head-
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one-vote. Studying the presence of practices that ensure continued participation 
and deliberation on relevant decisions and their modalities would add to extant 
research.  
6. Concluding remarks 
 
Hansmann focused on ownership. This paper has argued that there is no reason 
to assume that important levels of markets and contractual failure exist only for 
one patron. This can be even more relevant in sectors (such as health, social 
services, and education) where the complexity of the interests involved can be 
regarded as an explanation for the emergence of organisational solutions with 
multiple patrons.  
The total-effects model suggests that there are multiple coexisting ways of 
coordinating economic activities, and that failure to consider exclusion costs is 
associated with the coordination process in all its possible alternative forms. This 
means that both market and organised transactions can fail. The argument is that 
economic organising can be used not only when the costs of transacting are still 
high once property rights are defined, but also when externalities for the non-
owners are high. The total effects model offers a solution and explains that CE 
can often be effectively reduced by forms of governance that open control and 
direction to multiple patrons, not necessarily through ownership, but also using 
other forms of representation in decision-making.  
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Exclusion costs, in our model, are not a transitory feature of markets or 
governance solutions, but an intrinsic consequence of the failure of exclusive 
institutional solutions to identify and address the needs of multiple patrons and 
society at large. In order to reduce CE, multi-stakeholder solutions have already 
emerged, though the challenges posed by CM for these organisations require 
institutional inquiry. 
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